

# TRUSTWORTHY AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS

MAURICIO CASTILLO-EFFEN (MAURICIO.CASTILLO-EFFEN@LMCO.COM)

LOCKHEED MARTIN CORPORATION

IEEE TC on Verification of Autonomous Systems Seminar


June 4th, 2020

LOCKHEED MARTIN ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY LABORATORIES

**LOCKHEED MARTIN**




©2020 Lockheed Martin Corporation





# TRUSTWORTHY AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS (TAS)




# TAS APPLICATIONS




# COMPOSITION



# EMERGENT PROPERTIES







- |                            |                                      |
|----------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| ● Desired properties       | ○ System's violations of constraints |
| ● Unspecified but harmless | □ System's deficiencies              |
| ● "Shall not"s             | ◇ False positives                    |
| ● System's properties      | ★ False negatives                    |
| ● Model's properties       |                                      |

# PROBABILISTIC INTERPRETATION

$$\begin{aligned} P(S_{\mathcal{W}} \vdash \mathcal{R}) &= P(S_{\mathcal{W}} \vdash \mathcal{R} \mid S_{\mathcal{M}} \equiv_{\mathcal{R}} S_{\mathcal{W}}) P(S_{\mathcal{M}} \equiv_{\mathcal{R}} S_{\mathcal{W}}) \\ &\quad + P(S_{\mathcal{W}} \vdash \mathcal{R} \mid S_{\mathcal{M}} \not\equiv_{\mathcal{R}} S_{\mathcal{W}}) P(S_{\mathcal{M}} \not\equiv_{\mathcal{R}} S_{\mathcal{W}}) \\ &\geq P(S_{\mathcal{W}} \vdash \mathcal{R} \mid S_{\mathcal{M}} \equiv_{\mathcal{R}} S_{\mathcal{W}}) P(S_{\mathcal{M}} \equiv_{\mathcal{R}} S_{\mathcal{W}}) \\ &\approx P(S_{\mathcal{M}} \vdash \mathcal{R} \mid S_{\mathcal{M}} \equiv_{\mathcal{R}} S_{\mathcal{W}}) P(S_{\mathcal{M}} \equiv_{\mathcal{R}} S_{\mathcal{W}}). \end{aligned}$$


# EMPIRICAL APPROACH




Feedback for Developers

Assurance Evidence





# SIMULATION AS AN EXPLORATION TOOL




Challenges: scalability, automation for simulation-emulation-stimulation, data management

# REASONING ABOUT VARIABILITY





Target Distribution




[Courtesy: MIT Media Lab]

Lesioned Model



Full Model



*Before Training*

*After Training*

A complex network diagram with a central title 'REASONING ABOUT ADVERSARIES'. The diagram consists of numerous small, light-colored square nodes connected by thin, blue lines. The nodes are arranged in a roughly circular pattern around the central text, with some nodes appearing larger or more prominent than others. The background is a dark, gradient blue, and the overall aesthetic is technical and futuristic.

# REASONING ABOUT ADVERSARIES

©2019 Lockheed Martin Corporation

[Courtesy: DeepMind]

# CONFIDENCE QUANTIFICATION

**Driving to Safety** — How Many Miles of Driving Would It Take To Demonstrate Autonomous Vehicle Reliability?

N. Kalra, S. M. Paddock (RAND Corporation)

- Hundreds of millions of miles and sometimes hundreds of billions of miles to demonstrate their reliability in terms of fatalities and injuries.
- It would take tens and sometimes hundreds of years to drive these miles.


Waymo has driven ~10 million miles on the road and ~10 billion miles in simulation

**Alphabet's Waymo valuation cut 40% by Morgan Stanley to \$105 billion amid challenges in self-driving car market**

PUBLISHED FRI, SEP 27 2019•2:45 PM EDT

UPDATED FRI, SEP 27 2019•3:42 PM EDT

# COST OF V&V



Design / Build

Understand




Fig. 2. Comparison of the optimal split and a purely physical testing setting.

## Efficient Splitting of Test and Simulation Cases for the Verification of Highly Automated Driving Functions

Eckard Böde<sup>1</sup>(✉), Matthias Bükcr<sup>1</sup>(✉), Ulrich Eberle<sup>2</sup>, Martin Fränzle<sup>1</sup>, Sebastian Gerwin<sup>1</sup>, and Birte Kramer<sup>1</sup>(✉)

<sup>1</sup> OFFIS - Institut für Informatik, Escherweg 2, 26121 Oldenburg, Germany {boede,bueker,franzle,gerwin,kramer}@offis.de

<sup>2</sup> Opel Automobile GmbH, Bahnhofplatz, 65423 Rüsselsheim am Main, Germany ulrich.eberle@opel.com

# ROAD TO TAS

- A flexible path towards justified trustworthiness where one chooses the most effective assurance activities considering the increase in confidence and cost
- Exploitation of elastic computing resources
- Formal analysis informing empirical exploration
- Formalisms to capture mission variability
- Incorporation of adversarial behavior
- Operational assurance

# QUESTIONS?

[Email: mauricio.castillo-effen@lmco.com](mailto:mauricio.castillo-effen@lmco.com)

